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Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform, 




The January 21, 2010 Supreme Court decision in the case of Citizens United v Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC) fundamentally altered the role of corporations in 
the U.S political system. Upending over one hundred years of judicial precedent, 
this 5-4 ruling lifted previously establish limits on both the structure, and time-
frame, of corporate speech as it related to political communication. Even more 
fundamentally, the ruling can be seen as a paradigm-shaping moment regarding 
the interaction of corporations, citizens, and democracy. Resting on notions of cor-
porate personhood and speech protection under the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court's decision will have far-reaching implications in the overlapping spheres of 
economics and democracy. Specifically, how does a campaign finance system that 
is increasingly open to corporate influence interact with ideas of deliberative de-
mocracy? The influence of corporate money into the democratic system, or the ap-
pearance of its influence, can have deleterious effects on civic participation and 
social trust. Using the work of Joshua Cohen as an intellectual – and organization-
al – framework, the Citizens United decision will be analyzed in the context of the 
constitutive elements of deliberative democracy."  
 
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, 
to beg in the streets, and to steal bread – Anatole France 
  
While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have 
thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics – J. Stevens, Citizens 





he January 21, 2010 Supreme Court decision in the case of Citizens United v 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) fundamentally altered the role of corpora-
tions in the U.S political system. Upending over one hundred years of judicial 
precedent, this 5-4 ruling lifted previously established limits on both the struc-
ture, and time-frame, of corporate speech as it related to political communication. Even 
more fundamentally, the ruling can be seen as a paradigm-shaping moment regarding the 
interaction of corporations, citizens, and democracy. Resting on notions of corporate person-
hood and speech protection under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court's decision will 
have far-reaching implications in the overlapping spheres of economics and democracy. 
Specifically, how does a campaign finance system that is increasingly open to corporate in-
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fluence interact with ideas of deliberative democracy? The influence of corporate money 
into the democratic system, or the appearance of its influence, can have deleterious effects 
on civic participation and social trust. This is not to say, however, that corporations should 
have no speech rights when it comes to elections; rather, it is merely admitting the (long 
understood) potentially corrupting effect of amassed wealth on the U.S. electoral system 
(Raskin & Bonifaz, 1994). 
Both supporters and critics argue that Citizens United v FEC is sure to lead to an influx 
of corporate and union money in the political system. Through direct contributions to candi-
dates and parties, as well as to the creation and display of independent political advertise-
ments, the general treasury funds of corporations are now “in play” with regards to political 
contributions (an important point to which we will return shortly).  The beauty of this 
change in election finance law is in the eye of the beholder, however. As the 5-4 ruling 
would indicate, this is not a simple matter, nor one that is likely to go away in the near fu-
ture. One must weigh the competing values of the First Amendment with the value of free 
and equitable democratic deliberation. 
While there are indeed a great many legal arguments to be made about this case (and I 
would venture that a good deal are forthcoming), this research will examine the Citizens 
United decision within an ethical framework. Namely, how does the decision interact with 
notions of deliberative democracy and larger democratic principles?  What does an influx of 
corporate money mean for citizen deliberation – a deliberation that often requires equal 
standing among citizens to function correctly?  What are the democratic implications of cor-
porate personhood in the context of campaign finance and deliberative democracy?  Using 
the work of Joshua Cohen as an intellectual – and organizational – framework, the Citizens 
United decision will be analyzed in the context of the constitutive elements of deliberative 
democracy.    
 
 
Citizens United and Background 
             
Prior to a more in-depth examination of the effects of Citizens United v FEC, background 
information on the case may be helpful. Prior to the 2008 presidential election, a conserva-
tive non-profit corporation, Citizens United, produced a ninety minute documentary titled 
Hillary: The Movie. This film “focuses on Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton's 'Senate record, 
her White House record during President Bill Clinton's presidency . . . her presidential bid,' 
and includes express opinions on whether she would make a good president” (Lamberth, 
2008). If Hillary Clinton had become the Democratic presidential nominee, Citizens United 
also planned to air commercial spots within the legally restricted time period leading up to 
an election (thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general election) ("Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act 2 USC 431," 2002; Lindbloom & Terranova, 2009). Further-
more, Citizens United had also planned to distribute the film on Video on Demand (VOD), 
potentially running afoul of Section 201 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA) – which set limits of “electioneering communication” ("Bipartisan Campaign Fi-
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nance Reform Act 2 USC 431," 2002). 
To fully address the legal workings of Citizens United would take this research far afield 
of an ethical analysis. For further detail, the works of Urofsky (2005), Smith (2001), and 
Gais (1996) provide a great overview of the issues involved. The relevant portion here is 
that the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v FEC overturned two specific legal 
precedents and further weakened a long-standing tradition of  attempting to hold the 
(capital) barbarians at the (campaign finance) gates. Both Austin v Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce (which restricted corporations from using general treasury funds to support or 
oppose candidates) and McConnell v Federal Election Commission (in which the Supreme 
Court upheld restrictions on the timing, source, and content of electioneering communica-
tion by corporations) were overturned in the Citizens United decision. Tracing the intellectu-
al lineage of campaign finance law from the 1907 Tillman Act through the Citizens United 
decision, then, one can begin to draw conclusion regarding the ethical motivations for re-
stricting the influenced of amassed wealth on campaign finance, as well as how those no-
tions have changed over time ("Buckley v Valeo," 1976; "Federal Election Campaign Act, " 
1971; "WRTL," 2007). With these legal precedents in mind, we can begin to get a historical 
perspective on the relations between corporate capital and campaign finance. It is surely not 
a panoramic view, but even such a snapshot will provide a legal foundation that we can now 
shift into considerations of deliberative democracy and the ethical (as opposed to legal) im-
plications of the Citizens United ruling. 
Prior to these considerations, however, a few qualifying statements may be worth keep-
ing in mind. First, the Citizens United decision is not the end of American democracy, nor is 
it an inconsequential decision. The Supreme Court, in deciding to treat corporations as citi-
zens in this case, have continued a recent trend regarding the increasing power or corpora-
tions in the U.S. Thus, even though the decision overturned legal precedent going back over 
a century, it was more evolutionary than revolutionary; the provisions of the BCRA had 
been under attack for much of the decade. 
Second, corporate influence in politics and elections predated the Citizens United deci-
sion by roughly two centuries – this is not a new problem  Thomas Jefferson said of corpo-
rations: “I hope we shall... crush in its birth the aristocracy of our moneyed corporations 
which dare already to challenge our government in a trial of strength, and bid defiance to the 
laws of our country” (Jefferson, 1816). The formation of political action committees (PACs) 
and various forms of “soft money” have ensured the continual flow of capital into the politi-
cal/electoral process (Schultz, 2002). Justice Stevens, writing the majority opinion for the 
McConnell v Federal Election Commission wrote: “Money, like water, will always find an 
outlet” ("McConnell v Federal Election Commission (02-1674)," 2003). The changes 
brought about by Citizens United thus deal with the extent of corporate influence, not of its 
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Deliberative Democracy 
The concept of deliberative democracy has been something of a hot topic over the past few 
decades. The term, originally introduced by Joseph Bessette, has become a solid third camp 
in the debate over democratic forms (1980). Particularly prevalent in discussions of cyber-
democracy and the potential of communication technologies as democratic tools, delibera-
tive democracy has become a popular paradigm - competing with liberal individualist and 
communitarian approaches. Dahlberg writes of deliberative democracy: 
 
Deliberative democracy demands . . . free and open dialogue [in which] par-
ticipants put forward and challenge claims and arguments about common 
problems, not resting until satisfied that the best reasons have been given 
and fully defended. Participants attempt to come to an understanding of 
their interlocutors and to reflexively modify their pre-discursive positions in 
response to better arguments. In the process, private individuals become 
public-oriented citizens. Rather than the self-seeking utility maximizers of 
liberal individualism, the deliberative model relies 'upon a person's capacity 
to be swayed by rational arguments and to lay aside particular interests and 
opinions in deference to overall fairness and the common interest of the 
collectivity' (2001, 157) 
 
Deliberative democracy can then be generalized to rest on ideas of dialogue and equality. It 
is through rational discussion, achieved among equals, that a dialogic approach to political 
decision making can function. Where, and how, such discursive practices can take place is a 
matter of critical importance; the possibility of equality and open locations of discourse 
have led to a number of critiques of deliberative democracy (Besson & Martí, 2006). Alt-
hough a full account of the nuances of such an approach is beyond the scope of this essay, 
the brief definition will help provide a foundation for Cohen's constitutive components of 
deliberative democracy. More thorough treatments of deliberative democracy can be found 
elsewhere (Gutmann, 2004). 
As a way to conceptualize the nexus of deliberative democracy and the Citizens United 
ruling, Joshua Cohen's perspective will be useful. Drawing on the work on John Rawls' A 
Theory of Justice, Cohen offers three components of the ideal democratic order in a deliber-
ative democracy: 
 
1. In a well-ordered democracy, political debate is organized around alternative 
conceptions of the public good 
2. the ideal democratic order has egalitarian implications that must be satisfied in 
ways that are manifest to citizens 
3. democratic politics should be ordered in ways that provide a basis for self-
respect, that encourage the development of a sense of political competence, and 
that contribute to the formation of a sense of justice (1989). 
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Each of these components will be examined in the context of the Citizens United ruling. Alt-
hough there is some overlap between the points, keeping them separate will help to organ-
ize, and focus, the issues at hand. 
 
1. In a well-ordered democracy, political debate is organized around alternative con-
ceptions of the public good. 
 
That democratic deliberation should be organized around various conceptions of the public 
good may seem like an overly optimistic / utopian position to take. This is due, in large part, 
to the dominance of capitalism as a way of seeing the world. Indeed, shades of capitalist 
rhetoric can be seen in liberal individualist models of democracy – or more specifically in 
economic theories of democracy – as they suggest a fundamentally competitive view of so-
ciety and politics (Schumpeter, 1976). As Mary Dietz writes: “citizenship becomes less a 
collective, political activity than an individual, economic activity – the right to pursue one's 
interests, without hindrance, in the marketplace” (1992)  Viewing the demos, as well as de-
liberation and public speech, in economic terms is not an ideologically neutral position – a 
point to which this manuscript will soon turn. Both the individualization of citizenship, as 
well as its economic foundation, are concerns for those supporting deliberative democracy. 
In contrast to the liberal individualist approach, deliberative democracy, or at least the kind 
envisioned by the likes of Rawls and Cohen, moves away an economic view of democracy.  
Rather, political discourse should orient itself toward conceptions of the common good – the 
concern should not be maximizing individual benefits, but rather fostering the public good 
(Cohen, 1989).   
This is not to say that deliberation is the panacea to all the problems in democracy today. 
Rather, it indicates that when politics (ostensibly concerned with the public good) becomes 
privatized, it loses its ethical foundations. This concern with privatization brings us face to 
face with the concept of the “marketplace of ideas.”  Taking this metaphor seriously, two 
important implications come to the fore. First is the fundamentally dyadic nature of the mar-
ketplace concept; community and sociality are crowded out in favor of the two-sided trans-
action of “buyers” and “sellers.”  The ideological tendency of such a conception is then not 
one of public debate and discussion, but is more akin to consumer politics – shopping (a 
private activity) for ideas and political formations. The second implication of the 
“marketplace of ideas” branches out from this idea and considers the difference between 
being a citizen and a consumer. Citizenship contains in its shadow obligations and responsi-
bilities missing from the world of the marketplace. The positive liberties of citizenship 
transcend the freedom of the market to buy or not buy and require an active participation 
and realization within the political and social community. The purchase of political voice 
and the implications of the market for the political realm have recently been explored by 
Lessig (2011), Bartels (2008), Gilens (2005), and Solt (2008); each presenting a picture in 
which the wealthy largely set the political and economic agenda. Liberals may be content 
that the state has not erected impediments to the exercise of market power (in the realm of 
ideas or otherwise), yet widespread disaffection and distrust of the political system suggests 
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those ideas being bought and sold in the marketplace are not sufficient for a flourishing citi-
zen or body politic.  
Although Cohen's first component of deliberative democracy is arguably the least appli-
cable to the Citizens United decision, there are still compelling arguments to be made re-
garding their interaction. First is the tension between the public and the private: it is here 
that perhaps the largest discrepancy exists between the law and an ethical approach to the 
issue of campaign finance. The law leaves no doubt that corporate speech is in fact speech – 
and as political speech is of the highest order, it stands to reason that corporate political 
speech would be beyond the reach of government legislation. However, corporate speech is 
fundamentally different from political speech by a citizen.  
The rulings in Austin and McConnell were not bans on corporate speech, but rather can 
be seen as time, place, and manner restrictions. Thus, the argument that corporate political 
speech was silenced by the BCRA, Austin, and McConnell is simply not correct: members 
of the corporation, both as individuals and as members of PACs, had the full spectrum of 
political speech rights.  In weighing the competing claims of the interests of corporations 
with regards to the First Amendment against the interests of the public and the integrity of 
democratic discourse, the Supreme Court sided with the former.       
Here the “individual” rights of corporations (a contentious point in and of itself) runs up 
against the ideal of deliberation existing of and for the public. Between both the individual 
political potential of its members, and the opportunities afforded by PACs, what public ben-
efit could be derived from opening up the general treasury funds of a corporation for politi-
cal advertising?  The members of the corporation already had two existing paths. One of the 
potential consequences of the Citizens United ruling is that it will require capital consolida-
tion for any speaker to develop a political voice – or at least an equal voice. It is not in the 
public good to have a tier of political speech that is beyond the means of most citizens.   
Another concern regarding corporate expenditures is the issue of shareholder protection. 
Deliberative speech should accurately represent the views of those who are participating in 
the debate. There is a two-pronged criticism to be leveled here: first is the issue of share-
holder protection, as due to financial structures corporate electioneering may use the funds 
of investors and shareholders in ways those shareholders would not approve (or know) of. 
Second, the increasing prominence of corporate donations to both major political parties 
would indicate that, if money equals speech, corporate political speech is often argued out of 
both sides of the mouth. If, indeed, corporate political spending is oriented around their 
(corporate) conception of the public good (a very questionable assumption to begin with), 
why would contributions flow to parties that often have opposing views (Mullins and Spen-
cer, 2010)?  Ideal deliberation is predicated on an honest and open debate of various concep-
tions of the public good – if, as Justice Kennedy implied, money = speech, campaign contri-
butions to both parties or sides of an issue can be seen, at best as undermining deliberation, 
and at worst as corrupting the system. Even if large donations do not lead directly to politi-
cal corruption, the appearance of quid pro quo itself has deleterious effects on public trust 
and political engagement (Lessig, 2011). 
That corporations can donate to multiple parties is not in itself a problem – but it does 
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call into question the notion of corporate donations as speech promoting the public good. 
Unless one holds an opinion that corporate donations to both political parties are manifesta-
tions of a corporate belief in the sanctity of democratic institutions – with no expectations of 
a quid pro quo or other benefits – an increase in corporate money in the political system can 
not be viewed as a boon to deliberation regarding the public good. This is not to say that 
corporations should only be able to donate money to one party.  If, as some have argued, 
electioneering communication has little impact, why would corporations expend vast 
amounts of money supporting both parties?  This background is surely no smoking gun of 
corporate corruption – it is presented so as to offer some idea as to how the corporation is 
fundamentally different from individual citizens, even though the Citizens United ruling 
may argue to the contrary.   
 
2. The ideal democratic order has egalitarian implications that must be satisfied in 
ways that are manifest to citizens 
 
The emphasis on equality is a far more interesting question with regards to the Citi-
zens United decision. If democracy is to function, or if open and free deliberation is 
to take place, social and economic inequalities must not factor into political dis-
course. Deliberative democracy does not require an egalitarian society, but it does 
require that when dealing with issues of the public good, the weight of one's argu-
ments is more important that the weight of one's coffers. As Joshua Cohen writes: 
“in a just society political opportunities and powers must be independent of econom-
ic or social position – the political liberties must have a fair value – and the fact that 
they are independent must be more or less evident to citizens” (1989, 1). Equality of 
opportunity, access, and weight of political speech all factor into evaluations of the 
Citizens United ruling. It is again here worth remembering that Citizens United did 




Corporate Personhood  
A key facet of the Citizens United decision rested on assumptions of corporate personhood. 
Where corporations are operating in the same marketplace of ideas as individual citizens, 
care must be taken to ensure than an inequitable distribution of social/political capital does 
not accompany the inequitable distribution of its economic counterpart. Chief Justice Mar-
shal commented that “a corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those prop-
erties which the charter of its creation confers upon it…” ("Trustees of Dartmouth v Wood-
ward," 1819). In addition to its (paradoxically) incorporeal nature, the corporation also has 
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other important features relating to deliberative democracy and equality. Limited liability, 
perpetuity, and a degree of anonymity, along with the obvious aggregation of capital, are but 
a few of the advantages corporations enjoy in the marketplace of ideas. The very reason for 
the existence of corporations is the advantages they offer over individual action (primarily) 
in the economic sphere. Thus, while it may be necessary (legally) to treat a corporation as a 
person in the case of contracts and legal agreements, in the case of democracy the innate 
advantages corporations hold over individuals makes deliberation – which requires equality 
– an incredibly difficult goal. Instead of empowering citizens by giving them an equal share 
of speech in the political sphere,  the Citizens United decision further abstracts the demos 
from the government  - of which it is ostensibly in charge.  
 
 
Equality of Access 
If corporations are to be treated, politically, as individuals, then their inherent advantages 
create a tiered democracy.   Equality of access to the political system is a necessary precon-
dition for a functioning deliberative democracy: inherent social and economic distinctions 
undermine notions of trust and fairness. “Decisions resulting from deliberation may be more 
fair and legitimate because they result from reasons rather than arbitrary advantages. They 
may be wiser because they allow a broad range of perspectives and information to be pooled 
together” (Fung, 2003). This is not to say (necessarily) that social and economic inequality 
are problems to be remedied within the larger structure, merely that these cannot manifest 
themselves politically or in the context of ideal deliberation. This emphasis on equality per-
meates issues surrounding Citizens United.   
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote: “The fact that a corporation, or 
any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the 
people have the ultimate influence over elected officials” ("Citizens United v Federal Elec-
tion Commission (08-205)," 2010). To take Justice Kennedy's thinking one step further, his 
notion presupposes the special role of money in shaping the will of the electorate. Even 
granting the overly idealistic assumption that citizens influence elected officials more so 
than financial interests, the conflation of speech with money is ethically problematic. If one 
dollar equals one vote, what does zero dollars equal?  Or, to take another perspective, if the 
volume of one's political voice is determined by the volume of one's treasury – then the in-
fluence gap that already exists between those of differing socio-economic status further wid-
ens. The deliberative ideal that social and economic inequality not impact the political pro-
cess cannot coexist with the notion that money equals speech. By minimizing the power of 
economic advantages, it will help “to ensure that the political agenda is not controlled by the 
interests of economically and socially dominant groups” (Cohen, 1989). As Sheldon Wolin 
writes: “Campaign contributions are a vital tool of political management. They create a 
pecking order that calibrates, in strictly quantitative and objective terms, whose interests 
have priority” (2008, 140). 
Following larger social trends, then, the financing of political campaigns, and indeed 
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political speech, has shifted from the public good to a market product. It situates public 
speech as an alienable commodity and citizenship as a consumer good. Echoing the opening 
statement of this essay by Anatole France, the law, in its majestic equality, allow both the 
rich and the poor the right to pay tens of  thousands of dollars for political speech. Of 
course, not all political speech costs money – there are always letters to the newspaper, local 
activism, blogging, participation in township meetings, political party participation, etc. 
These means of political speech are certainly more accessible to those of lower economic 
status, but they also have a small potential audience of which to influence. Even so, the in-
fluence of money in state and local elections is increasingly important (Schultz, 2002). It 
would be impossible to deny the necessity of money in running a political campaign or in 
any effort to get elected to public office. However, the influence of amassed wealth and 
stratified level of donations have anti-democratic (and certainly anti-deliberative) tenden-
cies. Scott Thomas, commissioner for the Presidential Election Public Funding Program, 
writes: 
 
The underlying purpose of the program is to reduce the instance where can-
didates and their party apparatus would be susceptible to requests for favors 
by those who would arrange for funding the campaigns and conventions. 
Relying on funds raises from millions of individuals earmarking $3 of their 
taxes each year, rather than on funds raised from persons who can gather 
and forward batches of larger contributions, the candidates will encounter 
fewer quid pro quo situations as office holders (2003, 21). 
 
There are democratizing effects to limiting the large donations, whatever the source, in po-
litical campaigns. Be it in the form of hard money, soft money, or independent advertising 
expenditures (such as in the case of Citizens United), there is an equalizing effect in reduc-
ing the value of individual contributors or contributions (Eom & Gross, 2007, 695). Quid 
pro quo corruption has traditionally been the concern of campaign finance law, but the com-
modification (and subsequent sale) of access to candidates is also problematic.    
The explosive growth of the cost of political campaigns further opens realms that were 
previously public to the vicissitudes of the market. During the 2008 election cycle, over $5.3 
billion dollars were spent between presidential and congressional races (Cummings, 2008). 
The Center for Responsive Politics, an organization that monitors the extent of money in 
politics, notes that the 2008 presidential election cycle saw a 27% increase in the amount 
spent during the 2004 campaign ("The Money Behind the Elections," 2010). This marketiza-
tion of the public sphere is problematic in that markets and economic concerns are all pri-
marily oriented around the notion of competition. Although this may fit in with a liberal in-
dividualist model of democracy, ideals of deliberation and the public good are primary con-
cerned with cooperation. Embedded economic inequalities have a tendency to manifest 
themselves in the political process (Sanders, 1997, 347). 
Beyond merely abstract ideas of money as a speech in the political sphere, the Citizens 
United decision overturned two specific provisions that addressed to role of money in cam-
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paign finance: disallowing corporate general treasury funds to be used for political advertis-
ing, and overturning restrictions on corporations airing political advertisements within sixty 
days of a general election or thirty days of a primary. Together, these measures can be seen 
to aim at limiting undue influence of excessive corporate money in politics – not eliminating 
it altogether. Individuals could still participate in political speech through PACs or individu-
al actions; corporations could still participate in electioneering communication, as long as it 
was not within thirty / sixty days of the applicable election.; and as long as the funds did not 
come from the general treasury. These restriction did not extend to the CEO of the corpora-
tion (or the head of the union, for that matter), its board of directors, shareholders, etc. The 
political rights of speech afforded to these individuals was undisturbed by campaign finance 
rulings. Thus, the primary ethical grounding for the Citizens United decision – corporate 
personhood – foundationally presupposes inequality of resources and access. As noted pre-
viously, the very purpose for the creation of corporations is the economic advantages they 
offer over individual ownership. 
  
Democratic politics should be ordered in ways that provide a basis for self-respect, that 
encourage the development of a sense of political competence, and that contribute to 
the formation of a sense of justice 
 
It is worth noting here the difficulty in syncing ethical ideals and practical progress. It is 
easy to lament the importance of money in politics, but the issue is not a cut and dry one. 
The ACLU, in their amicus brief for Citizens United v FEC, wrote: “like many other advo-
cacy organizations, the ACLU has found that broadcast ads can be an important tool for pro-
moting our ideological goals” ("Citizens United v Federal Election Commission," 2010). 
Such a perspective fits in well with the goal of any advocacy organization that is attempting 
to influence the political landscape, either through electing politicians or promoting issues.   
There are two primary concerns here: first is the practical aspect of arguing for the best pos-
sible changes within the existing system (as the ACLU does here); the other is arguing 
whether the system is structured in such a way that small fixes may be regressive. Perhaps 
the cure is worse than the disease. 
Numerous authors have suggested difficulties, or indeed contradictions, in efforts to limit 
corporate funding on elections. David Ortiz, for example, has written that the notion of the 
uninformed and disinterested voter lies underneath many reformist perspectives on cam-
paign finance (1998, 893). Otherwise, advertisements of any kind would only be as effective 
as the information they contained – information that voters would be seeking out in other 
locations. Paradoxically then, deliberative democratic critiques of Citizens United may rely 
on the assumption of an undeliberative (unengaged) voting populace. A potential solution to 
problems of inequality and low-information voters was offered by Karpowitz, Rafael, and 
Hammond; these authors suggested enclave deliberation as a means of aiding the delibera-
tive ideal in the face of economic and social inequalities (2009). By focusing primarily on 
smaller deliberative gatherings, it will allow various groups to develop more fully their po-
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litical potential before entering into larger-scale political deliberations. This helps to avoid 
the domination by a “privileged sector” that is educated and socialized into democratic dis-
course (Sanders, 1997).  
More practical concerns are also raised against the notion of equality and deliberative 
democracy. Issues of incumbent protection, decreasing importance of individual contribu-
tions, and increased rent seeking from politicians are all concerns regarding campaign fi-
nance reform (Smith, 2001). The focus here is not on exploring the inner workings on cam-
paign finance reform, but rather to present the case that campaign finance – framed in ethi-
cal or legal terms – is not a simple matter. The complexity of the interaction between politi-
cal speech, the First Amendment, and economic capital has been a contested topic for at the 
very least a century. That shows no signs of changing. 
Groups such as the ACLU have also criticized various attempts at campaign finance re-
form as often stifling the political speech of smaller organizations, unions, and corporations. 
There is a delicate balancing act, then, in weighing the competing claims of citizens and 
capital. Attempts at limiting the influence of “big money” in politics may have the unintend-
ed effect of limiting the ability of advocacy organizations to propagate their message. When 
dealing with electioneering communication, one also has to consider that advertising time, 
satellite, and cable and broadcast networks are finite, and highly demanded, commodities. 
The prohibitive expenses of these expenditures can serve to crowd out smaller organizations 
(forget individual citizens). As the Citizens United decision has fundamentally opened the 
airwaves to more direct corporate political expenditures, the opportunity for direct corporate 
influence on elections is increased. 
Enclave deliberation and the arguments of groups such as the ACLU, however, are work-
arounds for inequalities – they do not address the underlying issue – how do you balance the 
First Amendment’s restrictions of government interference with existing inequalities that 
impact the sphere of political speech?  Does the economic necessity of forming large coali-
tions to achieve a political voice in the larger public sphere conflict with democratic ideals?  
If the solution to bad speech is more speech, does this not require a diversity of viewpoints 
in political speech?  Can problems created by political speech by Adelphia be cured by more 
speech from Enron?  These are questions that will have to be answered, in one form or an-
other, in the coming years. But they are worth thinking about now, particularly in relation to 
how we view the rights of business interests in the public sphere. 
One of the more corrosive effects of the increasing importance of money in politics is its 
depoliticizing effect. While a deliberative democracy depends on an active and engaged citi-
zenry, trends in the U.S. political system indicate that political participation is often correlat-
ed to class and economic status (Lijphart, 1997). By further opening up the political process 
to the demands of the market, the public service function of the government is becoming 
quasi-privatized. As the mechanisms of power become further and further removed from the 
demos, a fatalism sets in: if politics is controlled by money, what role do those without eco-
nomic power play? 
The issue of inequality also manifests itself in another way with regards to the Citizens 
United decision. Beyond the inequalities of opportunity, there is also the issue of unequal 
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weight of various actors in a deliberative democratic framework. Both social and economic 
capital elevate the speech of one group over another: the former through issues of civic trust 
and credibility, the latter through access to larger platforms and media. Both the medium 
and the identity of the speaker are relevant when issues of politics are involved – one would 
be hard pressed to argue that a letter to a local newspaper had the same effect as the Swift 
Boat Veterans for Truth had on the 2004 presidential campaign (Mitchell, 2006, 29). That 
various media have different impacts on voter opinions and the democratic process should 
come as no surprise: however, the varying weights (or potential impacts) of various types of 
political speech creates a tiered system where one dollar equals one decibel.   
Given the difficulties in a pure deliberative environment, Lynn Sanders considers juries 
as microcosms of a larger deliberative ideal. By examining the workings (or shortcomings) 
of jury deliberation, greater insight can be had into how inequality impacts a deliberative 
environment. “participation on a jury seems to involve exactly the skills and capacities that 
Democrats hope Americans might practice in other settings . . .” (Sanders, 1997, 347). How-
ever, a closer examination of the jury environment would suggest that social and economic 
inequalities have a serious effect on deliberation.  
 
The most important democratic hope for deliberation is that deliberation in 
juries or elsewhere enhances citizenship by inspiring autonomy and a sense 
of community; in other words, it produces conditions of mutual respect. Yet 
again, social hierarchies and patterns of oppression may hamper this goal, 
afflicting deliberation sufficiently so that participation instills a sense of 
alienation rather than either autonomy or community (Sanders, 1997, 369).      
 
The social and economic biases inherent in the U.S. have specific consequences within a 
deliberative environment. The weight afforded to specific positions, through various social 
hierarchies, alter the reception of the message. There is thus an interest – and an important 
one in a deliberative democratic context – in minimizing the deliberative advantages eco-
nomic and social status offer. To bring this back to the Citizens United decision, the further 
opening of the political arena to corporations and “big money” exaggerates, rather than min-
imizes, the advantages social and economic status offer. If, as Thomas Stratmann argues, “a 
$100,000 increase in advertising increases the vote share by about .2 percentage points,” 
economic position has a specific effect on both the voting and deliberation process (2009, 
357). If money equals speech and limits on corporate expenditures are a limit on said 
speech, then the democratic process has indeed been captured by economic logic. This does 
not foster a development of political competence, but rather outsources politics from the 
public sphere to the private; from the intellectual realm to the economic one; and from the 
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So What? 
    
The Supreme Court decision in the case of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 
is sure to have a lasting impact both on political campaigns in the future legal challenges 
that arise of campaign finance legislation. Resting on issues of corporate personhood and the 
notion that money equals speech, the most recent ruling represents not a revolution in the 
role of money and campaign finance, but rather an evolution. Since the Tillman Act of 1907, 
a gradual invasion of corporate and private finances into the role of political campaigns has 
been the standard. The gradual ascendance of capital in the public sphere is supported by the 
notion (repeated by the Supreme Court) that money = speech.   If, in fact, one takes the posi-
tion that money does equal speech, what are the larger implications of this in a deliberative 
democracy? In particular, what role does inequality play in the democratic sphere – do so-
cial and economic inequalities lead to political ones? The Citizens United decision is a spe-
cific moment in history that provides an opportunity to consider these questions. 
The work of Joshua Cohen here provides one framework (among the many possible) 
through which to view the decision. Offering a Rawlsian perspective, Cohen's constitutive 
components of deliberative democracy allow for a somewhat compartmental evaluation of 
any deliberative environment. Concerned, generally, with 1) alternative conceptions of the 
public good; 2) egalitarian implications; and 3) political competence, Cohen's research sets 
up an idealized deliberative democracy against which real-world situations can be com-
pared. It is in this context that the specifics of the Citizens United case present a compelling 
window into the contemporary state of deliberative democracy and campaign finance. By 
overturning limits of where corporate money may come from (general treasury instead of 
PACs), when corporate advertisements may be shown (within thirty days of a primary or 
sixty days of a general election), and insisting that regulation of corporate speech is in viola-
tion of a corporation's First Amendment rights, the Citizens United decision has further 
stratified the contemporary political environment. By cementing the idea that money equals 
speech, and expanding the role of corporate money in elections, political speech has been 
shifted toward a privatized good. If dollars are directly correlated with political speech and 
an increase in votes, what does that say for citizens without access to wealth? Or ideas who 
lack wealthy sponsors?   
The Supreme Court ruling in the case of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 
will have serious effects on the growing importance of the role of money in political cam-
paigns. In a society that is seeing a growth in income disparity and economic segmentation, 
that political speech and campaign finance should be swept up in a wave of privatization 
should be in no way surprising. However, there are inherent dangers in the increasing cap-
ture of the governmental process by private interests – dangers that are only exaggerated in 
the wake of the Citizens United decision. The “marketplace of ideas” logic has gone too far 
when the demos can no longer afford to participate in the deliberative realm.       
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